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As recent events have shown, the energy situation has continued to be
somewhat critical, and it doubtless would become so even absent the car-
telization of production by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting coun-
tries. The crisis is partly political, partly economic; in either case there has
been an erosion of the legal frameworks for international oil business which
must be recreated if there is to be reliable exploration, production, and pricing
consistent with world needs.
The legal institutions so laboriously established to protect foreign commerce
in the past have not been adequate to meet the nationalist demands of newly
powerful countries. At best, international law is not self-executing, but rather
depends on the consensus of nations with respect to political and moral
precepts. The accession of great numbers of newly independent countries to
the community of nations, many with ancient cultures or new economic
regimes far different from those dominating the international community in
the past, are bound to put unprecedented strains on this consensus.
In examining this unique problem, one must consider some of the legal
assumptions upon which international energy management operated from the
beginning of the industry until the late 1960s. First, it was assumed that the
exploitation of mineral resources was an appropriate enterprise for private
industry. While such industries were nationalized in some states in connection
with complete social reorganization, and specific industries, like Britain's coal,
were nationalized in others, the vast majority of petroleum production was
conducted by private companies for profit. The capital for such exploitation
came from private sources and frequently from sources outside of the
producing country. The necessary capital investment was made on the
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assumption that such investment would be protected and profits would be
repatriated.
It was assumed that management was entitled to determine production
levels, quality control, pricing, marketing arrangements, and so on. There were
no requirements as to local hiring and no penalty for failing to explore a
concession, or failing to exploit a discovery. All that was needed from the host
government was license to conduct the business as a corporation, title to the
petroleum, and surface rights necessary for production and transportation.
These rights were obtained in the form of concession agreements, for which
the host government received rent, a bonus and royalties. The earliest
agreements did not even address management rights. These agreements
covered huge territories, and purported to extend for decades, some for the
century. In the United States it was even easier; one needed only to purchase
the land and drill.'
Considerable evolution in the Middle Eastern agreements has taken place
over the years. As profits grew after World War II, the major companies there
agreed to a tax based on tonnage produced, amounting to roughly 50 percent
of the concessionaire's profits as computed from tax reference prices.'
But throughout the 1960s there was general acceptance of certain basic legal
premises: Management was entitled to run its business as it deemed
appropriate to maximize profits, its property was entitled to respect and
protection, and contractual rights were pretty well respected. Such precepts
may have a Western, or even Anglo-Saxon ring to them. It may be that their
practically universal acceptance derived from the force of Western arms and
colonialist policy. But, regardless of their source, they constituted a generally
accepted legal regime for the conduct of the international oil business and on
the basis of such assumptions, investments were made, supplies assured and
prices determined.
This framework is now in shambles. In many areas of the world with
important petroleum reserves, the sanctity of contracts has been undermined
by assertions of the debilitating and highly slippery qualification of "rebus sic
standibus" ("circumstances remaining unchanged") or attacks based on their
unconscionableness or the circumstances of negotiation. Freedom of manage-
ment is also carefully circumscribed to ensure maximum benefit to the state
rather than maximum profit. In many countries, the very title to foreign
property is now deemed subject to the over-riding economic prospects of the
state.
'See generally, Best, Middle East Oil and the U.S. Energy Market, 5 LAW & POL. uN IN'L Bus.
215 (1973); Mining the Resources of the Third World: From Concession Agreements to Service
Contracts, 1973 AM. Soc. INT'L LAW PRoc. 227 if; Note, From Concession to Participation:
Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 774, 775-85 (1973).
2See id. at 778.
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The causes are diverse, but the reduction of Western influence abroad must
be deemed the most important causal factor. One can point to the British
withdrawal from the Middle East; and to the decline in established influence
in other areas as well, as in Latin America and Africa, where colonial rule has
been virtually eliminated. Not only has Western influence on their legal
systems been reduced, but countries whose economies were once run by
Western governments and corporations are now independent and required to
fend for themselves, to produce their own prosperity. In many cases, resource
treasures appear to be a ready, if not the only, means for attaining the kind of
prosperity enjoyed by the industrialized nations. Freed from the constraints of
alien commercial law and responsible for their own economic destiny, the
political pressures in many countries to take unilateral action independent of
their international and contractual obligations has been too much, and the
system upon which international oil management previously depended
disintegrated.
Such changes should have been foreseeable as early as 1960. In that year,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and other important producing nations joined
together to form the organization of petroleum exporting countries. Its initial
purpose was to reverse a price rollback which the companies had adopted in
1957 as a result of overcapacity. It was not entirely effective, but it did succeed
in devising policies for increased tax revenues from their exports.'
Thereafter, various individual countries successfully renegotiated certain
provisions of their concession agreements affecting training for local em-
ployees, representation on boards of directors, relinquishment of undeveloped
territory, and other matters. New agreements tended to provide for mere
service functions for or joint ventures with the majors.'
Then, in 1970, Libya demanded increased revenues on account of its
accessibility to Europe following closure of the Suez Canal. When these
concessions were negotiated, the other Arab producers demanded and
obtained similar tax increases. Accordingly, Libya demanded still further tax
concessions based on its preferred geographic position. Thus a full circle of tax
increases was in progress, known as "leap frogging," all in disregard of the
terms set forth in concession agreements previously agreed to. A general
settlement was finally worked out in February, 1971, which it was agreed
would be binding at least until 1976, but it, too, was doomed to collapse. Each
amendment under the gun represented a further erosion of the reliability of
contractual agreements. And in 1972, Libya, having already expropriated
3See generally, id. at 779; Akins, The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here, 51 FOREIoN
AFFAIRS Q. 462 (1973).
4See generally, Mining the Resources of the Third World, 1973 AM. Soc. IN-fL LAW PROC., supra
at 230-34 (Remarks of Frick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Standard Oil Co., Ind.); Note, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REV., supra, at 780-83.
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British petroleum, expropriated a number of American oil companies, and
reduced production.'
In the Middle East, tne major oil companies and ARAMCO negotiated a
participation agreement, whereby Saudi Arabia and the other governments
would acquire a 25 percent interest in their operations immediately, rising to
51 percent after 1981. Subsequently, largely as a result of Libya's actions and a
complete takeover in Iraq, this agreement has unraveled, and the governments
are now demanding 100 percent ownership. Kuwait and Qatar already have 60
percent participations in operations in their countries.6
What are the effects of these events? Be it immediate or after a few years,
total control of the principal sources of international petroleum will have
passed to the governments of the host countries. Most management
prerogatives have effectively changed hands already. In the boycott a year ago,
American corporations were obliged to terminate direct supplies to the United
States. Production levels and exploration levels are dictated by the host
government. The companies' much touted function of buffering relations
between the consuming governments and the producers is entirely gone.
In the future, the oil companies' role will be primarily that of service
organizations retained to provide the expertise necessary for exploration and
production, to some degree the transportation, and to a degree which may
continually change, the marketing. The role once played by the companies in
negotiating price and supply must now devolve on the governments of the
consuming countries.
Some of these changes appear fair and appropriate for renegotiation, such as
managerial training for qualified local applicants, conservation controls, and
production quotas. It is hard to deny participation provides a fairer return to
the host country than the early 20th century concession. But with majority
control passing to the host governments, the role of international management
has changed indeed. The power to control prices, the power to ensure fair
geographical distribution, are no longer present. Where such powers were once
checked and balanced by dispersion among a number of competing corporate
entities interested in the good will of the governments of those countries in
which they marketed and resided, there has now arisen an effectively
unrestrained monopoly control over prices and production by the OPEC
countries.'
And of course, the reliability of contract upon which international as well as
domestic commerce depends is compromised. Reference is frequently made to
'See id. at 784-86; Akins, supra, at 470-75.
6See Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra, at 786-814.
'See generally Levy, World Oil Cooperation or Economic Chaos, 52 FoREIGN AFFAIRS Q. 690,
693-98 (1974).
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resolution 1803 of the General Assembly of the United Nations which provided
that "the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national
development and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned." 8 That
resolution was adopted in 1962, and represented a kind of compromise
between countries seeking confirmation of their sovereign right to dispose of
their wealth and natural resources and the industrial countries seeking
recognition of the necessity of honoring commitments and of treating foreign
capital in accordance with the requirements of international law. As a
compromise, resolution 1803 paid lip service to both interests, remained vague,
and has been used by both importers and exporters ever since. It did not change
international law with respect to treatment of foreign capital, and one may ask
whether it represented anything new with respect to sovereignty over resources.
Such sovereignty had been recognized from the earliest concession agreements,
and presumably, the right of sovereignty includes the right of alienation or
disposal. The real issue is that of contract, and on that score, resolution 1803
provided that, when foreign capital is authorized it shall be governed by the
terms of such authorization and by international law, as well as domestic law.'
The international protection to be accorded foreign investment was
confirmed in 1973 by a sole arbitrator appointed by the president of the Court
of International Justice, to arbitrate the claim of British Petroleum against
Libya, on account of its nationalization. 10 The arbitrator confirmed that BP was
entitled to compensation under international law, an award which itself has
been ignored by Libya. The arbitrator also stated, however, that BP was not
necessarily entitled to the oil subsequently produced from its former
concessions. BP and other companies are nevertheless pursuing a claim to such
oil, sometimes referred to as "hot oil," in some 37 different legal actions
around the world."
'Resolution 1803, 17th Sess., December 14, 1962, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII), 2 I1'r'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 223 (1963).
'Paragraphs 3 and 8 of Resolution 1803 provide:
3. In cases where authorization is granted [to explore or develop natural resources], the capital
imported and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by national
legislation, and by international law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely
agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being taken to
ensure that there is no impairment, for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its natural
wealth and resources....
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall be
observed in good faith ....
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties Among States, Res. 3281, 29th Sess., Dec. 12, 1974,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX), 14 INr'L LEGAL MATLS 251 (1975), however, asserts a right to
expropriate with a duty only for "appropriate" compensation. None of the western capital-exporting
countries voted for the Charter.
I°Unpublished by agreement of the parties.
"In BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Astro Protector Compania Naviera S.A. (Ct. of Syracusa,
Italy, February 15, 1973), 13 INr' L LEGA MAI'LS 106 (1974), an Italian court rejected BP's claim to
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To an overwhelming degree, the problems of international energy
management have become more diplomatic and less legal.2 Nevertheless,
there remain a number of areas relating to international oil trade in which
legal responses have been made, which should give us hope. The principal
areas of legal success have been with respect to pollution. 3
Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, an International Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties was negotiated in 1969.1' This
convention gives coastal states the right to destroy or tow away stranded ves-
sels that pose au oil-spill hazard. An International Convention of Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage was also negotiated in 1969, which provides liability
for oil carriers regardless of negligence. 5 It limits liability to $15.2 million,
however, if that amount is put in escrow at the outset of the claim.
Participating states are also required to demand that their ships carry
certificates of financial responsibility for pollution liability. In addition, there
is an international convention on the establishment of the 1971 International
Funds for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, to which oil cargo carriers
are required to contribute.1 6
Perhaps of most importance, as the world faces increasing reliance on atomic
energy, is the 1972 Ocean Dumping Convention. 7 This convention prohibits
dumping at sea of certain dangerous substances from vessels, aircraft, and
title to Libyan oil extracted after expropriation. But see U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on "Hot"
Libyan Oil, May 7, 1974, 13 INr'LLEGALMA'Ls 762-82 (1974); Recovering Confiscated Assets and
Capturing Sanctioned Goods: Extant and Prospective Remedies, 1973 AM. SoC. INT'L LAW PRoc.
71 ff.
"See, e.g., Resolutions of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Nos. 155 (June 28,
1973), 158-160 (September 16, 1973), 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 220-22 (1974); Agreement
Establishing the Latin American Energy Organization (November 2, 1973), 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
377-89 (1974); Communique of the Washington Energy Conference, February 13, 1974, 13 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 462-64 (1974): Organization of Petroleum ExDorting Countries Declaration
Concerning the International Economic Crisis, March 6, 1975, 14 INT'l LEGAL MAT'Ls 566-67
(1975); Communique' and Declaration of Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Developmjnt, May 30, 1974, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 995-99 (1974); Conference of Developing
Countries on Raw Materials, Dakar, Action Program and Resolutions, February 8, 1975, INT'L
LEGAL MAV'LS 520 (1975).
"See Muir, Legal and Ecological Aspects of the International Energy Situation, 8 INT'L LAWYER
1 (1974).
"November 29, 1%9, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 25 (1970); S. Exac. G. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
Ratification of the International Conference Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Oil
Pollution Casualties was approved by the U.S. Senate on September 20,1971.
"November 29, 1969, 9 IN'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 45 (1970), S. ExEc. G. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
"December 18, 1971; 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 284 (1972); S. ExEc. K. 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
"7December 29, 1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL MA'LS 1294 (1972). See also, International Convention for
the Preservation of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended, 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1 (1970);
International Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1294
(1972); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 12 IN'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 1319 (1973).
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platforms except as licensed by appropriate authorities in the party states.
Specifically included are oil, mercury, and high-level radioactive wastes.
There has also been considerable international cooperation with respect to
research and development. For the present, the universal need to reduce world
oil consumption seems to outweigh national desires to monopolize technological
advantages. There are a great number of bilateral agreements between the
United States and foreign governments to pursue particular research and
development projects. In 1973, energy related projects were selected for
implementation of the 1972 agreement on cooperation in the fields of science
and technology between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United
States and Japan entered into a formal agreement for research in fusion and
breeder reactor technology and preparations were undertaken for a more
comprehensive energy research and development agreement. There are a great
number of other such agreements. 8
There are also a number of multilateral research and development efforts
in energy. Perhaps most important is the International Atomic Energy
Agency established in 1956. The NATO committee on challenges of modern
society has undertaken cooperative development projects in solar and geother-
mal technology. The OECD has commenced a study of its members' programs
relating to energy as well as energy research and development. There are
numerous other projects between the United States and groups of other
particularly interested countries, on projects such as coal research, fast reactor
accident prevention, mineral exploration and other matters. Some are
governmental only; others contemplate the contribution of private industry.19
But clearly the most important issues are still before us. In October, 1973,
the Arab producers embargoed shipments of oil to the United States and the
Netherlands. At present, there is apparently no principle of international law
which bars such an embargo per se in the absence of applicable treaties.20
Foreign trade has always been a matter within the prerogative of sovereign
governments. A number of commentators have referred to the principles of
friendly relations among states adopted by the United Nations, to refrain from
economic coercion, and obligations in the United Nations charter itself to
abstain from acts which threaten the peace. But these are general principles,
and have been universally ignored in the particular case of foreign trade.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 ' does contain certain
provisions which are pertinent. That agreement was originally negotiated after
"See generally, Pollack & Congdon, International Cooperation in Energy Research and
Development, 6 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 677 (1974).
"Id.
"See Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INrL LAW & EcoN. 187 (1974); Shihata,
Destination Embargo ofArab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L LAW 591
(1974).
"Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. All major non-Communist
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World War II to ensure access to markets, and its principal effect is to bar
discriminatory tariffs. It also contains language, however, to ensure access to
the exports of other countries.
It provides, for example, that a country should not impose export restriction
except in certain circumstances, and if it does, it must do so in a manner
which gives recognition to historic trade patterns between itself and countries
which it has traditionally supplied.2" Unfortunately, a number of crucial oil
producing countries have never stibscribed to this agreement, including Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, and Venezuela.
Agreement has been reached among a number of industrialized states with
respect to sharing available oil supplies in event of a crisis shortage. 3 If a
shortage amounting to 7 percent affects all the parties, they will be committed
to reducing their demand by 7 percent. If the shortage reaches 12 percent, the
parties are required to reduce demand by 10 percent and if deemed necessary,
the parties would be required to use reserve supplies and share all oil in their
possession, including imports and domestic supplies. Allocations would be
made by the quasi-independent industry advisory body in the International
Energy Agency. The program would also help individual countries faced with
supply problems, again, when the shortage reaches 7 percent.
Those who have worked with the OECD's International Advisory Board,
which was established to equalize the flow of crude to Europe, will understand
the kinds of problems to be anticipated in implementing the proposed system.
Extensive data collection and reporting; infinite meetings and discussions; and
urgent reroutings, diversions, and sales revisions, are all part of the game. While
industry cooperation in past crises has been noteworthy, the new system will be
mandatory under the laws of participating states, and presumably the antitrust
problems which the companies faced in their efforts to cooperate in the
International Advisory Board and in the Emergency. Petroleum Supply
Committee in the United States will be resolved. The sharing agreement is a
limited one, however, obviously, a response rather than a cure to the
continuing crisis in international energy trade.
,trading nations are parties to the "GATT."
22Article XI provides,
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures shall be instituted or
maintained ... on the exportations of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.
Articles XI and XII provide for a number of exceptions, as to relieve critical food shortages or
safeguard a party's balance of payments. But Article XIII specifies that any quotas adopted must
allocate in such a way as to take account of historic trading patterns. An exception in Article XX
relates to conservation measures to protect exhaustible natural resources, but that too is subject to
the requirement that such restrictions "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail."
"
3Agreement on an International Energy Program, Paris, November 18, 1974, 14 IN1VL LEGAL
MAI'LS 1 (1975).
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What about other existing treaties and institutions? The World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund have been grappling with the monetary
fall-out of the precipitous rises in oil prices, but they are constitutionally
unequipped to address the underlying issues' of price, production and
accessibility. The fund has established a facility to provide financing to
countries threatened by petroleum deficits. 24 But, again, this is only
ameliorating the effects, rather than treatment of the underlying problem.
Unhappily, it must be concluded that existing organizational schemes are
inadequate for the most important issues: price, access, and investment of
capital. What is required is an entirely new legal-diplomatic effort, of the same
magnitude as the ongoing Law of the Sea Conference. The importance of
pricing to the world's economic stability is evident from the state of Italy's
economy as well as that of numerous other nations, both industrialized and
non-industrialized.
What is needed is a forum for the negotiation of prices in the full light of the
interests of all peoples of the world. What are needed are guidelines or criteria
for determining fair price including fair pay for labor, compensation for
depletion of resources, return on capital, but no less importantly, the
dependency of the world's economic development on access to energy at a
reasonable cost.
There is no reason such guidelines cannot be agreed upon. All that is needed
is an appropriate forum, good faith, and confidence. With these the apparently
irreconcilable can be compromised. To borrow a term from labor-management
negotiations, what is needed is a forum for "collective bargaining."
Such a forum is, I submit, entirely within the range of our diplomatic and
legal experience and capacity. Oil is, after all, merely another commodity-per-
haps more crucial than sugar, but certainly not more so than wheat. As early as
1948, a United Nations conference on trade and employment drafted a charter
for an international trade organization. 2  That charter contained extensive
provisions relating to the establishment of commodity agreements, objectives,
voting and other operational matters. Some of its provisions are timely
indeed-Article 63 provided that such agreements should be designed, ".. .to
assure the availability of supplies adequate at all times for world demand at
prices which are in keeping with the provisions of Article 57(c) .... " That
Article goes on to provide that voting should be allocated so that the votes of all
consuming countries equal the votes of all exporting countries. Commodity
agreements have been adopted in the past, they have operated, and have
grappled with issues no less complex and highly charged. In particular, one
4IMF Exec. Bd. Dec. 4241-(74/67) adopted June 13, 1974; renewed Exec. Bd. Dec. 4634-(75/47)
adopted April 4, 1975 (designed to make resources available to countries suffering balance of
payments problems as a result of increased costs for oil imports).
"See 14 WHmIMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 618 if. (1970).
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may refer to the Wheat Trade Convention of 1967, and its predecessor, the
International Wheat Council. That convention establishes certain maximum
and minimum prices subject to adjustment by a price review committee. The
International Tin Agreement created buffer stocks and set prices to trigger
sales and purchases to stabilize the world market. Equally sensitive, but
less price oriented negotiations were once conducted under the International
Coffee Agreement. 6
It is usually asked, what inducement is there for the OPEC countries to
participate? Two are readily apparent. One is their sense of international
responsibility, which is attested to by the repeated statements by Sheik Yamani
concerning the need for a dialogue among producers and consumers, and by the
Shah of Iran concerning possible meetings between OPEC and the OECD. 7
In addition, the producing countries are acutely aware that their economy is
based upon a wasting asset, and that unless they provide an alternative base
for their economy over the next decades, they may lose their only chance to
achieve prosperity and development. And it is precisely in these fields of
economic planning, of science and technology, and of industrial development,
that the consuming countries can provide something to the producers which
they desperately need. A commitment from the consumers to provide an
alternative economic base against the day of resource exhaustion, and to
provide security for capital invested from oil profits, might not be deemed an
unreasonable basis for consent to collective bargaining on price.28
Unless these issues are dispassionately addressed in a spirit of compromise
and mutual benefaction, the prospects for world peace cannot be viewed very
sanguinely. The world's economy cannot be left to the unilateral discretion of a
single bloc of countries, be they producers or consumers. Nor can the world be
allowed to revert from freedom and development to a kind of reverse
imperialism. 9 It is hoped the producers will act from a sense of social
responsibility to the world as well as to their peoples. The issues are urgent and
crucial to the world's economy as it adjusts to the post-petroleum age.
"See id., at 638-80.
"Admittedly, these and statements to like effect by other Arab leaders preceded the debacle at
the proposed producer-consumer conference in Paris in April, 1975. (See, e.g., advertisement of
Iraqi Interest Section in the Washington Post, February 11, 1974, headlined, "Today the Major
Energy Consuming Nations are Meeting in Washington. Iraq believes all consuming and producing
countries should be meeting in the United Nations.") While differences as to agenda (the producers
insisted on discussing all raw materials at Paris) may persist, a predilection of producers to negotiate
with governments concerning their patrimony rather than with the multinational oil companies
appears constant. In any event, increased participation by the U.S. government in negotiations
concerning price and production so long eschewed because of laissez faire policy and fear of
politicalization, now seems essential.
28A concern for security vis-avis the Soviet Union must also be a consideration. See Levy, supra,
n. 7 at 705-06.2 9Compare the provisions in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra n. 9:
Article 24. All States have the duty to conduct their mutual economic relations in a manner
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which takes into account the interests of other countries. ...
Article 31. All States have the duty to contribute to the balanced expansion of the world
economy, taking duly into account the close interrelationship between the well-being of the
developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and the fact
that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its
constituent parts.
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